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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the option of implementing a rental
system within the Department of Defense military family housing program,
as outlined by the DoD in Defense Management Report Document 966 and a
Congressional Budget Office study from 1993. Specifically, it
determines the effects of a DoD rental system on the La Mesa housing
program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, with the
purpose of identifying possible financial implications for the DoD and
the La Mesa housing management.
The analysis focuses on the ability of this program to continue to
operate, build its inventory and compete in the local housing market by
collecting rent and using a revolving fund. After investigating the
program's cost and simulating setting initial rental rates, this study
concludes that a rental system at the Naval Postgraduate School would
provide sufficient net income and cash flow to continue to operate.
Further, this study discusses several other financial implications
related to alternative housing programs, political realities and
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As the United States Navy prepares for the post Cold War challenges
of the future, it must do so in a period of rapidly dwindling resources.
The large federal deficit experienced during the 1980's and 1990's has
become a top concern of every American. As a result, Congress is
embarked in an ambitious attempt to reduce federal spending.
Unfortunately, the majority of these cuts have come from defense and
other non-entitlement programs.
Of major concern to both the Navy and the Congressional leadership
is that the rapid reductions to our fleet and infrastructure may leave
the nation with a "hollow force" unprepared for the next conflict.
Chief among these concerns is the effect these reductions will have on
the quality of life and therefore the performance of our sailors. The
1989 Defense Management Report cited quality of life as the top priority
for military leaders CRef.l:p.l]. The current Secretary of the Navy,
the Honorable John Dalton, echoed this sentiment in the Department of
the Navy's posture statement:
We must manage this right-sizing with great sensitivity and a
determination to keep faith with our people. If we fail, and if we
lose the trust and confidence of our people; no matter what
management plans and programs we put into place, no matter what
mission we have, our bottom line combat readiness in the long term
and the short term will decrease and our capabilities as naval
forces will be reduced. Therefore, our greatest effort must be to
ensure that our men and women are properly motivated, trained,
compensated, and rewarded as we go through these revolutionary
times. CRef. 2:p.4]
With the current fiscal environment, defense decision-makers are
faced with the task of meeting operational objectives while streamlining
budgets. The Navy has already set a course to take ship levels as low
as it believes possible while still fulfilling its newly established
mission "...From the Sea". However, should further cuts be required to
defense, the Navy must be ready to take additional cost reduction
measures.
One program several government reports have cited that could yield
substantial savings is the Military Family Housing (MFH) program. The
Department of Defense (DoD) is the world's largest landlord. It employs
1.526 million active duty servicemembers and currently owns or leases
over 300,000 units of family housing at a cost of about $3 billion each
year CRef. 3:p.n. The Department of the Navy (which includes the U.S.
Marine Corps) is a very large family housing user with a 1994 average
inventory of nearly 100,000 units and a yearly budget of over $1
billion.
Despite being the largest landlord, the DoD has historically had a
policy of relying on the private sector housing market to meet its
requirements CRef. 4:p.2]. Of those servicemembers who have families
and live in the United States, two-thirds currently use cash allowances
totaling over $4 billion annually to rent or buy housing in the private
sector. The remaining third forfeit their cash allowances and receive
DoD assigned housing.
The DoD's reliance on the private sector for housing has proven to
be a sound policy from a fiscal perspective. "The cost, over the long
run, of DoD housing provided to members of the armed services is, on
average, approximately 35'/. greater than the cost of private sector
housing that is chosen by comparable military families in the same
locations." CRef. 3:p.i] This is supported by the fact that allowances
forfeited by servicemembers cover only 60% of the cost of military
housing. It is this higher cost that has caused the DoD to re-think its
housing policy. In an era of cost consciousness, one must ask if
housing provided to only one-third of our Navy families (only 15% of the
total Navy population) is a good investment at an additional 35% cost.
The DoD has recognized the housing program has problems and
concluded in a recent review that "the housing allowance has come to
present the Department of Defense with one of its greatest, most
persistent compensation challenges." CRef. 5:p.7] The Department and
other government agencies have made recommendations ranging from
maintaining the status quo to expanding MFH, eliminating MFH, cutting
back MFH but offering newer units, and others. Perhaps the most radical
recommendation, and the focus of this thesis, is instituting a quasi-
rental market system within military housing.
Advocates of this quasi rental market system include the
Congressional Budget Office (CBQ) and the Department of Defense as
expressed in several Defense Management Report Issues. Although
proposals have some differences, their basic concepts are the same. By
requiring housing complexes to compete with the private sector on a
rental basis, the military would be able to reduce its inefficiencies by
closing unnecessary complexes in areas where the value of DoD housing to
servicemembers is less than the cost of providing that housing.
B. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
Accepting that there are inefficiencies in the current DoD military
family housing program, this thesis examines a specific solution
outlined by the Congressional Budget Office in its 1993 study titled,
"Military Family Housing in the United States." It will attempt to
determine the effects of a DoD rental system on a housing program with
the purpose of identifying possible financial implications for the
Department of Defense and the housing management. Specifically, would a
housing program be able to maintain its ability to operate, rebuild its
inventory, and be likely to compete in the local housing market?
The first objective will be to determine what the actual direct and
indirect costs are to operate a housing complex. The second objective
will be to simulate collecting rents from current tenants in order to
determine its expected revenues. The third objective will be to analyze
its expected net income by determining if the revenues collected would
cover the costs of operations, maintenance and recapitalisation of
assets. The fourth objective will be to analyze a program's cash flows
to determine if it can become self-sufficient. The fifth objective will
be to analyze if a rental system implemented in a typical housing




If the DoD implemented a rental system within a single military
family housing complex, could this complex continue to provide and
maintain adequate housing and if so, would this produce a net loss or
net savings to the U.S. taxpayer?
D. SCOPE
This study is limited to the La Mesa Village MFH at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California. Focus is placed on
the financial implications of implementing a DoD rental policy at NPS.
It is not the intent of the thesis to determine if a rental policy would
be effective for the entire Department of Defense, but lessons learned
and insights from the study will be provided for future researchers.
Nor is it intended to address the adequacy of the current system or to
define officer preferences for different types of housing.
E. LIMITATIONS
At the time of this study, the Fort Ord Army base is in the process
of closing and some of its facilities are being turned over to the Naval
Postgraduate School, including the management of 600 housing units to be
used by students. Although the Army is still responsible for Fort Ord
housing, several NPS students are being assigned quarters on the base.
Despite these recent housing changes, it is not the intent of this
thesis to determine the effects of this base closure on the demand for
NPS or Monterey housing.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
The analysis for implementing a rental system within a military
family housing project will be based on a Congressional Budget Office
recommendation and Defense Management Report Document 966. It is beyond
the scope of this thesis to analyze the effectiveness of these two
recommendations. Rather, it is assumed that DoD eventually adopts the
proposed recommendation to implement a rental system and this thesis is
the reaction of one housing complex to the change.
G. RESEARCH SOURCES
This thesis is conducted using primarily archival research at the
Naval Postgraduate School and investigative research at the La Mesa
housing complex. The history and background of the present DoD housing
program were found in library material in the NFS library. Past DoD
recommendations contained in Defense Management Report Documents were
provided by Retired RADM Richard Milligan, Conrad Chair at NPS.
Historical data is used to explain current DoD housing policies and to
show problems requiring a policy change. The actual costs to operate La
Mesa Village were obtained through personal interviews with the housing
staff at La Mesa Village.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The thesis is divided into five chapters including this
introduction. Chapter II provides the history of military family
housing, in order to give a better understanding of DoD's current
housing program, which is covered in Chapter III. Chapter IV describes
the Congressional Budget Office's recommendation for implementing a
rental system within the military family housing program. Chapter V
presents the findings and analysis from this study. Chapter VI provides
a brief summary, conclusions and lessons learned from this thesis.
II. HISTORY OF MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING
A. EARLY HISTORY
In order to gain an appreciation for current housing problems, as
well as to understand the Department of Defense's justification for its
housing policies, a brief review of the history of military family
housing is required. The issue of how to house our soldiers goes back
to the very beginnings of this nation. Servicemen were originally
farmers and merchants and lived at home while they served. Therefore,
there was not a need for organized housing. Yet, as the military grew
from a revolutionary militia to an established Army, Congress realized
it must care for individual soldiers. The first act of legislation
directly related to providing for individual soldiers was in 1782, when
Congress authorized a Major General to be provided one four horse drawn
covered wagon and one two-horse drawn covered wagon. CRef. 6:p.3]
Providing for entire families was apparently not an issue in the
early days of the military. When Army soldiers went into the field they
constructed tents and other types of temporary shelter. Navy sailors
lived primarily onboard their ships, a practice that continues today.
Although both services did "requisition" local community housing on
occasion, for the most part, servicemembers were expected to be
separated from their families. If they chose to have family members
accompany them, then family housing was up to the individual soldier.
B. THE FIRST MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING
Most of the first family quarters were built for senior officers
because their positions required them to be close at hand. The Navy's
first set of senior officer quarters was built in 1802 for Captain
Thomas Tingey, the first Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard. The
Tingey house, declared an historical building, remains today as the
residence of the current Chief of Naval Operations. The Navy built
similar homes in many of the other naval bases such as Norfolk,
Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Boston, and Portsmouth. CRef. 6:p.4] "These
quarters were built for the benefit of the Government as an essential
element of military discipline and protection rather than for the
convenience and comfort of the occupant." CRef. 6:p.3]
By the early 1800 's, the United States was expanding and on-station
quarters began to be constructed in forts and installations. Some of
the first military family housing began in the forts where officers were
allowed to bring their families to live with them. The rules for these
quarters were very simple, "a lieutenant received two rooms, a captain
three, a major four and so on." CRef. 7:p.4] As space was limited any
officer not able to live in the fort was allowed to rent housing in the
local town until room became available. Not addressed at this time was
the inequity of those living in the private sector having to purchase
housing out of their basic pay while those on-base did not. CRef.
7: p. 10]
C. THE FIRST HOUSING ALLOWANCES
1. Housing Allowances During the War of 1812
The military first addressed the issue of allowances to augment
basic pay in 1813 when the Army authorized a quarters allowance. This
action was necessary because of the build-up caused by the War of 1812.
During the war, the Army increased from 6,686 men in 1812 to 19,036 men
in 1813. The Army had actually tried to recruit more men for the war
but was unsuccessful. As a result of this recruiting failure, Congress
for the first time, used allowances for quarters as an incentive for
service. The incentives were successful and the Army was able to
recruit and sustain an Army of 27,000 men until the Civil War. [Ref.
6:p.4] Prior to the Civil War, however, the military housed very few
military families. For the most part, servicemembers were expected to
either remain single or leave their families at home while they served.
2. Allowances During the Civil War
During the Civil War the Union Army and Navy rose from a
strength of 76,000 to over one million men. In 1866, after the war, the
standing force was reduced, but remained substantially larger than at
the start of the war. This larger force required revised military
family housing policies. In 1866, Congress repealed an act of 1835
which had eliminated the allowance for quarters, heat and light
previously available to officers. To re-enact these allowances the
Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Wells, issued General Order 75 which
"established a family quarters allowance equal to one third of pay for
officers who could not be provided with family quarters on shore
stations." [Ref. 6:p.4] This legislation set a new precedent. For the
first time, quarters allowances mere now related to base pay. In the
past they had been set at specific rates for different areas.
3. The Basic Allowance for Quarters
In 1872, the Basic Allowance for Quarters Act was passed which
provided five dollars a month per room to any officer who was unable to
get military housing. It did not, however, include an allowance for
enlisted personnel. This Act is significant because set a precedent
still valid today, "that the military department will provide its
members a house or money in-kind". CRef. 7:p.l0] The statement "in
kind" is often used to mean that the allowance should be sufficient to
obtain quarters off base comparable to those on base.
4. Allowances During World War I and World War II
As the nation began to prepare for World War I, Congress enacted
an important benefits program. In August 1916, Congress passed an
appropriation which provided $2,000,000 to the military to support the
families of enlisted personnel who were recruited or drafted. This was
needed to compensate those who gave up higher paying jobs to join.
Compensation for families was limited to not more than $50 per month,
and "not more than the difference between a serviceman's pay and what he
had been contributing to the family at the time of his recruitment or
draft." CRef. 6:p.6]
The system of providing housing allowances for rent, heat and
light at varying rates ended in 1935. The Senate Subcommittee for Pay
and Allowances for Fiscal Year (FY) 1936 considered the uncapped rates
too expensive, and changed housing compensation to a "fixed" allowance.
Regardless of local housing prices, the new allowances had a ceiling of
$20 per month. The new allowance did not include compensation for heat
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and light expenditures. "This marked the end of market responsive
allowances until the introduction of the Variable Housing Allowance
(VHA) program in 1980." CRef. 6:p.61
5. Allowances for the All-Volunteer Force
The DoD housing allowance program required a major renovation
when the military shifted to an all-volunteer force in 1973. In order
to encourage people to enlist the government had to consider increasing
incentives such as housing allowances. For the first time, enlisted
personnel were offered BAQ and given wider access to on-base housing.
To demonstrate the magnitude of the policy change, in 1974, 29% of the
family housing units owned by DoD were set aside for officers. But, by
1991 only 18'/. of family housing was used by officers.
D. CONSTRUCTION OF MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING
1. Early Housing Construction
By the turn of the 20th century, an extreme shortage of housing
existed as a result of the large number of officers who took their
families West. The housing shortage made it apparent to the Congress
that it would not be feasible to build houses for every married military
member. Congress, therefore, developed a public policy, still in effect
today, that the "prime source of housing for military families is the
adjacent private community". CRef. 7:p.ll3 When housing construction
was required it was focused in areas where the surrounding community was
unable to meet the housing demands of the military.
The policy of providing on-station quarters for only key
personnel continued into the early 1900 's. In fact, up until the
beginning of World War I, the Navy inventory consisted of only 289
11
houses, all of which mere designated for officers. It was not until
1915 that the government began to recognize the family housing needs of
enlisted personnel. In 1915 an act was passed that allowed enlisted men
an allowance for quarters at a rate of $15 a month. [Ref. 6:p.5]
2. Housing Construction Before World War II
Although some building of family homes was conducted during the
years leading up to World War I, mass construction of housing on bases
did not begin until 1939 when the Lanham Housing Act was introduced.
This Act allowed smaller and more shoddily constructed homes to be built
to house those individuals building the many bases that would be used
during World War II.
Immediately prior to World War II, the total armed forces
housing inventory was 25,000 units [Ref. 6:p.7]. However, World War II
required housing for many more individuals than just key personnel. To
meet these new requirements, the first "Defense Housing" was authorized
by Public Law 76-671 of 28 June 1940. The housing was built by civilian
contractors but leased and operated by the Navy. By 1941, the Navy had
been given a total of $56,822,500 to construct this housing. The
housing surge did not last long when much of the mass housing
construction was halted in 1942 to support the war effort. The only
housing that continued was for barracks at training sites. [Ref. 6:p.7]
3. Housing Construction During World War II
Most servicemembers were encouraged to leave their families at
home during World War II. However, as the war progressed morale began
to drop because of family separation. There was not enough housing for
families to reunite when servicemembers were back in the United States
for 30 day furloughs. The armed forces faced an incredible challenge
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to build housing for its personnel considering the size of the force.
In 1939, the Army and Navy had a strength of 335,000, but by 1945, that
number had grown to 12 million. The Navy's solution to the problem was
the "Homoja" program. In 1943, the Navy began to build transient
quarters on naval bases throughout the United States for Naval personnel
and their families.
Homoja units were 960 square feet metal Quonset Huts with living
room, kitchen, bath, and bedrooms, and were completely furnished
for light housekeeping. Because of their spartan nature, Homoja
units were not considered suitable for permanent occupancy, so
residence in these units was limited to 60 days. A total of 6,285
Quonset Huts were built before the war's end. CRef. 6:p.83
When the war in Europe ended, thousands of civilian and military
personnel transferred to the Pacific coast to gear up for the war with
Japan. This influx caused another housing crisis. In response, the
Navy-Federal Public Housing Agency's Defense Construction Program
provided funding for over 10,000 family housing units in 70 different
locations. These units were "standard design houses consistent with
best livability, low cost, and construction speed." CRef. 6:p.93
4. Housing Construction After World War II
After World War II, most U.S. servicemembers returned home to
their families and military housing construction remained relatively
inactive. However, the war had brought several changes in the make-up
of Naval personnel. Numerous technical innovations developed during the
war required the retention of specially trained enlisted personnel. The
occupation of Japan and several European countries also required a Navy
larger than pre-WWII levels. Consequently, despite large overall
cutbacks, the Navy maintained a post-war manning level of about 1.5
13
million, about four times its pre-war strength. Additionally, the Navy
was now made up of a much higher percentage of married personnel.
At first, the military thought that it would be possible to
build enough housing to take care of all military families. In 1948 the
Hook Commission, an advisory group appointed by the Secretary of
Defense, believed that housing allowances should be the exception rather
than the rule. They also believed that there was a strong correlation
between personnel living on-base and military readiness. It became
apparent, however, that it would not be possible to house a standing
Army as large as the post WWII Army. As a result, DoD continued to rely
on its policy of using private sector housing for the majority of
military members. [Ref. 3:p.8]
5. Housing Construction During the Cold War
Before the war, the relative insignificance of the Navy's family
housing program was attributed to "the relative stability in the level
of military personnel, their longer tenure of assignment at an
installation, and the smaller ratio of married personnel in the Navy ...
with a less frequent relocation of families." CRef. 6:p.9] However, to
meet the post-war demand for family housing, Congress passed the Wherry-
Spence Act and authorized 60,000 units in its first year. Of these, the
Navy was authorized 15,000 at 23 shore installations.
The Wherry program was unique because it authorized privately
financed housing projects to be constructed on government owned
land. The land was to be provided to private project sponsors who
would arrange financing (under FMA insured mortgages); construct,
and then operate the projects. The military then leased the
projects back from the sponsors. CRef. 6:p.9]
By 1954, the Wherry program had constructed 83,000 units at an average
cost of $9,000 each. The Wherry Act helped solve the Navy's housing
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problem but many criticized the program because the units were of
questionable quality.
By 1955, the military family housing inventory had grown to
approximately 224,000 units. "Of these units, 47,000 were Defense
housing units and were considered inadequate, 48,500 were temporary,
87,500 were Wherry units, and the remainder were other permanent
units. "CRef. 6:p.l0] As a successor to the Wherry program the Congress
passed the Capehart Act. It was similar to the Wherry program in that it
authorized the construction of military family housing on government
owned land by contractors who obtained private financing. The Capehart
program was different in that the government took title and assumed the
mortgages and operation of the housing once completed. During the first
year 100,000 units were authorized over a five year period at an average
cost of $13,500 per unit. In 1963, at the end of the program, a total
of 104,900 units had been built.
The military family housing built during the 1950's and 1960's
makes up most of the current DoD inventory. Some housing was
constructed by Secretary of Defense McNamara during the mid 1960's. His
prime justification for requesting additional housing units from
Congress was because he believed the existing units were in poor
condition and that too many families were separated because of a housing
shortage. After this last housing build-up, which added only a modest
amount of a new units, housing construction and policy remained
relatively inactive.
This chapter gave a brief overview of the history of the DoD's
military family housing program. Chapter III describes where this
program is today.
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III. THE CURRENT DOD MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING PROGRAM
A. MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING APPROPRIATIONS
The DoD military family housing program is funded by an annual
Congressional appropriation. An appropriation is a legal statute that
provides budget authority for the military services and other federal
agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury.
Appropriations are necessary for DoD to operate its over 300,000 units
within the continental United States at an annual cost of over $3
billion. Table 1 CRef. 3:p.2] shows the current DoD housing inventory.
TABLE ITOTAL DOD FAMILY HOUSING UNITS WORLDWIDE
UNITED FOREIGN TOTAL
STATES
OWNED 305 , 000 99 , 000 404 , 000
LEASED 8 , 000 27 , 000 35 , 000
TOTAL 313, 000 1 26 , 000 439 , 000
Table 2 breaks down the number of families that live in military housing
by service, revealing that the Navy actually houses a smaller proportion
of families than its sister services.











The Navy may house a smaller percentage of families because of a history
of long deployments away from families or because housing is more
available in seaports than in isolated Army and Air Force bases.
CRef. 2:p.5]
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Funding tor Navy housing comes from an appropriation titled Family
Housing, Navy and Marine Corps (FH,N&MC). FH,N?<MC is broken down into
two categories, Construction and Operations & Maintenance. The
Operations and Maintenance (0?<M) account provides funding for the cost
of housing management, appliances, services, leasing, repairs and
utilities. It has a one year obligation period which means that funds
for a given year can only be obligated in that year. The Construction
account provides funding for the planning and construction of new units
and housing improvements to existing units. Unlike the 0?<M account,
Construction has a five year obligation period to allow for the time
consuming process of awarding contracts and completing construction.
Supported by the FH,N?<MC appropriation, the Navy owns and operates
nearly 70,000 units. Table 3 [Ref. 8:p.58] shows the Department of the
Navy's budget and spending plans from 1993 to 1995.
TABLE ^.DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY MFH BUD GETS 1993 1995 fin SOOO's)
1993 1994 1995
NAVY
CONSTRUCTION 284.9 345.1 180.7
0&M 567.2 669.0 747.4
TOTAL $852.1 $1,014.1 $928.1
MARINE CORPS
CONSTRUCTION 94 . 25.1 48.6
0?<M 98.4 103.1 106.2
TOTAL $192.4 $128.2 $154.8
NEW CONSTRUCTION
NAVY PROJECTS 11 6 1
USMC PROJECTS 3 1
NEW CONSTRUCTION
NAVY UNITS 1,279 1,375 136
USMC UNITS 600 196
AVERAGE # UNITS
NAVY 70,172 69,384 68,560
USMC 22,864 23,168 23,437
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Annually, each service department must develop a budget request tor
their anticipated MFH expenditures as a part of the overall service
budget request to Congress. The number of units constructed with
appropriated funds actually remained steady throughout the 1970 's, but
then declined in the 1980's when alternatives to appropriated funding,
such as Section 802 Lease's, became more desirable.
Although "quality of life" issues have gained much attention in the
1990's, family housing construction has not increased as steeply as many
experts believe necessary. The reason for this is "partially because of
tight budgets and partially because of a reluctance to modernize or
build units at bases that may end up being closed." CRef. 9:p.60] Table
4 CRef. 103 shows the recent trend in MFH construction appropriations.
TABLE 4: MFH CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATION TREND S
(all amounts in $ million's)
YEAR ARMY NAVY USAF TOTAL
83 127.8 114.7 143.9 386.4
84 172.7 68.0 111.4 352.1
85 143.2 117.0 181.1 441.3
86 249.1 133.0 173.4 555.5
87 357.6 171.5 110.8 639.9
88 331 .0 238.4 1 Oj . wJ 732.7
89 214.8 244.8 186.6 646.2
90 88 . o 130.6 127.1 346 .
91 85.6 175.0 169.2 429.8
92 172.7 285.8 217.8 676.3
93 161.9 378.9 250.0 790 .
8
94 228.9 370 .
2
187.0 786.1
B. HOW THE NAVY PLANS ITS FUTURE HOUSING NEEDS
Military housing is provided by appropriations from Congress.
However, how the military decides what its present and future needs and
how the Congress develops its funding levels is a fairly complicated
process. Construction for MFH is authorized by Congress only after a
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shortage of housing exists or only in areas inhere the cost of housing is
unreasonably high. In order to determine which areas are suitable for
construction a market analysis of that area is conducted.
According to the DoD, the market analysis has become the
preferred document for inclusion into the President's budget for
military construction, and when requesting Congressional
authorisation to undertake a public/private venture. The market
analysis' thoroughness is vitally important because it determines
that no alternative means, other than military construction, is
available to alleviate the current family housing shortaqe.
CRef. Il:p.l7]
Each report contains the demand, af f ordabi 1 ity and availability for
civilian and military housing. Once a determination has been made that
no other alternative, except to build MFH, exists, the project enters
the military's planning system.
Evaluating the needs of family housing is done through the
Department of the Defense's process called the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS) . During the first PPBS phase, Planning, broad
national security objectives are considered in order to develop force
structures to counter threats to national security. During the
Programming phase strategic plans are transformed into programs defined
in terms of forces, personnel, material, and dollars. The Budgeting
phase translates these programs into biennial funding requirements.
During periods of rapid defense growth, such as the 1980's, it is
relatively easy to match what is needed by the services with what the
Congress is willing to spend. However, during tight fiscal years this
process is much more difficult. During the Cold War and the Reagan
build-up, the Navy, perhaps rightly so, concentrated a large portion of
its budget to building a large Navy.
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C. HOUSING CONSTRUCTION ALTERNATIVES
1. Military Construction
Military Construction (MILCON) is the usual method for building
family housing. In order to obtain military construction authorization
it must be shown that the local civilian housing market cannot meet the
needs of the military community. MILCON funded housing is built
primarily by private firms under the supervision of the Army Corps of
Engineers or the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. In recent years,
military construction funded housing has been difficult to sell to
Congress because of cost and the constrained budgetary environment.
2. Section SOI Program
In 1984, the military began experimenting with alternative
methods of constructing housing in order to "reduce the family housing
deficit." CRef. 7:p.l5] Specifically, Sections 801 and 802, of the
Military Construction Authorization Act were enacted to provide low cost
alternatives to MILCON.
Section 801 authorizes the government to contract with local
businesses for family housing units built to service standards. Under
this program the government makes all lease payments to the contractor,
maintains the units and makes all assignments to quarters. Similar to
MILCON, tenants do not pay rent but instead forfeit their housing
allowances. However, to get an 801 lease the housing project must save
at least 5'/« over MILCON. In recent years, however, the 801 program has
been considered all but dead because Congress has been unwilling to
write the specific budget line items required to secure an 801 project.
20
3. Section 802 Program
Section 802 instituted a Rental Guarantee Program in 1984. This
program, similar to the Section 801 program, gives a guarantee that the
government will maintain a minimum occupancy rate of 97% over a twenty
five year period in exchange for affordable rates and priority placement
to military families. If there is an insufficient number of military
renters, unoccupied units can then be rented to civilians.
Like the 801 program, for a project to be approved it must cost
less than military construction. However, under an 802 lease, the units
can be built to either DoD or local standards and are managed and
maintained by the developer, not the government. A major difference
between 802 and 801 is that servicemembers do not forfeit their housing
allowances but instead pay monthly rent. The initial rent is set to
comparable rents charged in the local market area. Like 801 projects, a
separate line item Congressional authority is needed.
4. 2667 Lease Program
Another alternative to military construction is the Title 10
2667 Lease Program. It is similar to the 801 and 802 programs in that
private firms build military housing. Similar to the 802 program, units
do not have to be built to DoD specifications thus saving the government
money and manhours. [Ref. l:p.28] Another very important difference is
that construction under the program does not have to conform to the
Davis-Bacon Wage Act. This act requires use of local labor wage rates
based primarily on the local union rate which can increase construction
costs by up to 157.. One of the most successful construction projects
under the 2667 Lease Program is the Sun Bay Apartments at Fort Ord,
Cal ifornia.
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The creation of alternatives to military construction funded
housing is an indication that DoD is shifting its policies in order to
maximize the advantages of market forces. If DoD implements a rental
policy within its MFH program, the 801 Program will proPably be
discontinued. However, lease agreements such as 802 and 2667 should
assist housing managers secure low cost construction contracts. Keeping
construction costs low will be of paramount importance if housing
managers are to be able to compete with local housing.
D. HOUSING ALLOWANCES
1. Introduction
As was detailed in Chapter II, housing allowances have changed
considerably over the past 200 years. Housing allowances are very
expensive to the federal government, with DoD spending about $6 billion
each year. Today, in addition to basic pay, members of the armed
services can be eligible for up to 34 different allowances and 55
special and incentive pays. The two most common allowances are for food
and housing. Although basic pay is taxed by the federal government,
housing and food allowances are tax-free.
The objective of housing allowances is to make "suitable
(acceptable and affordable) housing" available to every servicemember
living outside MFH. "Acceptable housing is within 1 hour's commuting
time, meets minimum square footage requirements and basic structural
soundness tests, and has water, heat, and electricity; affordable
housing does not require servicemembers to exceed specified out-of-
pocket costs." CRef. 12:p.l] Those choosing to live in government
housing forfeit these housing allowances. However, as previously
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stated, the majority of military families do not live in government
provided housing. Table 5 CRef. 3:p. 7] breaks down the percentages of
military families that live in government and private housing.
TABLE 5:H0USING PATTERNS OF MILITARY FAMILIE S IK THE U.S..1991
PAYGRADE IN DOD IN PRIVATE OWN PRIVATE NUMBER OF
HOUSING SECTOR SECTOR FAMILIES
E1-E3 20% 76% 4% 76 , 000
E4-E6 357, 41% 24% 552,000
E7-E9 26% 20% 54% 152,000
Wl-03 29% 30% 41% 109,000
04-05 18% 20% 62% 73 , 000
06 26% 15% 59% 13,000
07 AND ABOVE 67% 0% guA 1 , 000
ALL GRADES 30% 36% 34% 946,000
2. Who Is Eligible for Housing Allowances?
Current housing allowances are actually two separate allowances:
the Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and the Variable Housing
Allowance (VHA). According to Title 37, section 403 of the United
States Code, "a member of a uniformed service who is entitled to basic
pay is entitled to a basic allowance for quarters." CRef. 7:p.24]
Servicemembers with dependents receive higher BAQ allowances.
In the late 1970's, BAQ was insufficient in many areas to cover
the full cost of housing. Rapidly rising housing costs began to erode
the buying power of military housing subsidies. To narrow the gap, a
geographic adjustment called the Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) was
created. A member of a uniformed service entitled to BAQ is entitled to
a VHA whenever assigned to duty in a high cost area of the United
States. An area is considered to be a high cost housing area whenever
the average monthly cost of housing in that area, for members serving in
the same paygrade as that member, exceeds 115% of their BAQ. After
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1986, if a person received more in BAQ and VHA than they spent on
housing they were required to give back half the overpayment.
3. How Are Housing Allowances Adjusted?
The total of BAQ plus VHA was intended to cover 857. of the
nationwide median housing costs so that the military member would only
have to pay 157. of the cost of living off base from his or her basic
pay, also known as "out of pocket casts". However, since 1981 the
percentage of housing costs not covered by housing allowances has risen
from 10*/. to 20*/,. While Congress tried to limit out-of-pocket costs to
15%, annual adjustments have not been effective and out-of-pocket
expenses continue to rise. CRef. 3:p.9]
VHA rates are established for areas based on data from the
national housing survey which is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau
CRef. 7:p.25D. This survey collects data on the housing expenditures of
military families in the different housing areas. Based on the results
of the survey, an area's allowance rate may be increased or decreased.
BAQ rates are increased in two ways: under amendments to the United
States Code and through Congressional ly authorized increases to military
pay. Although housing allowances were increased on January 1, 1994,
they did not increase enough to offset a 3.1% increase in housing costs.
CRef. 9:p. 60]
E. MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING PROBLEMS
1. Inefficiencies of Appropriations Funding
Although military family housing has been funded by
Congressional appropriation for many years, not all experts agree that
this is the most cost effective method. Inherent in the Congressional
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process are inefficiencies such as congressmen lobbying for housing
construction in their district regardless of whether there is a need for
the new housing. For example, included in the 1992-1993 Defense
Authorization Bill were barracks improvements at Forts Hood and Bliss in
Texas. Neither military construction account was requested by DoD.
CRef. 13:p.70]
For reasons such as these, funding by appropriation has been
cited as an inefficient way of providing MFH. Funding by appropriation
keeps important decision making far removed from those most involved
with the process, the housing management. "This method of funding, along
with various restrictions on contracting, does not allow the local
installation to run DoD family housing in the most cost effective
fashion." CRef. 4:p.l4]
2. High Cost of Constructing and Operating Units
The government, without the aid of market forces, has been
unable to provide housing at lower cost than the private sector. "The
cost over the long run of the DoD housing provided to members of the
armed services, on average, approximately 35'/. greater than the cost of
the private sector housing that is chosen by comparable military
families in the same locations." CRef. 3:p.xi] In addition, the
allowances forfeited by servicemembers accounts for only 60% of the cost
to provide military housing.
DoD housing is built primarily by private firms under the
supervision of the Army Corps of Engineers or the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command. Construction of military housing is not
competitive with private sector housing, however, because of additional
government regulations governing DoD units but not private units. For
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example, the governmental process of planning, doing market analysis,
gaining Congressional approval, preparing bids, construction and
inspection takes DoD units up to 10 years to complete. Table 6 shows
the differences in time frames for the housing construction process
between the government and the private sector.
TABLE 6:PRIVATE SECTOR VS MILITARY CONSTRUCTION TIME-FRAMES
EVENT GOV. PRIVATE
SECTOR
MARKET ANALYSIS 6 mos 6 mos
ENVIRONMENT ASSESMENT/SITE INVESTIGATION 6-9 mos 6-9 mos
APPROVAL BY SERVICE SECRETARY 6 mos N/A
BUDGET SUBMISSION 1 year N/A
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION/FINANCING 2 years 6 mos
BID ACCEPTANCE 6 mos N/A
DESIGN 1-3 vrs 1 year
START CONSTRUCTION ASAP" ASAP
COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE 1 year 1 year
TOTAL 7-10 yr 1 year
Government regulations also come in the form of strict
specifications such as square footage, number of bedrooms and quality of
components such as air conditioners and playgrounds. The differences
between what a private firm would do for a private unit and what they
are required to do for the government adds 12*/ to the cost of DoD
housing. CRef. 3:p.22]
The cost of labor is also between 5 to 15% more expensive when
private contractors construct DoD units than when building private
sector units. DoD construction is governed by the Davis-Bacon Act which
requires that labor be paid at "prevailing wages." [Ref. 3:p.21]
Prevailing wages have developed to mean the going wage rate of the local
union which may or may not be the lowest local wage rate.
Government housing is also more expensive to operate and
maintain than private sector housing. "The Institute of Real Estate
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Management notes that average operating expenses for rental units in the
private sector account for approximately 40 percent of gross rent."
CRef. 3:p.22] A typical private sector unit rented by a military family
would have annual operating costs under $4,000 a year. However, the
operating cost for a DoD unit in the same area would average $6,200 a
year. The major reason for the cost differential is that occupants of
DoD housing have no incentive to conserve utility usage since they do
not pay for these services. Utility costs make up about 30% of DoD's
operations and maintenance costs for MFH. "According to some estimates,
the cost of utilities for rental units in the private sector drops 207.
when people become responsible for their own utility costs."
[Ref. 3:p.23]
3. Housing Is Not Built in High Cost Areas
Construction for MFH is authorized by Congress only after a
shortage of housing exists. However, building in an area where their is
scarce housing means that the cost of building these units will be at a
premium.
Housing availability in communities is cyclic and when housing is
in short supply, military installations also experience shortages.
In order to program new construction, a housing shortage must
exist for the entire new construction procurement cycle. During
housing shortage periods, all housing is at a cost peak. If local
costs decline, the military shortage eases ... DoD has no
authority to obtain units when the need - and cost - is less
severe. In short, the Government "buys high, sells low."
[Ref. 12:p.3]
It is also questionable whether DoD is even adhering to its
policy of building MFH in high-cost or isolated areas. According to the
CB0 "most DoD family housing units are not located in high-cost or
isolated areas where it might be difficult to obtain housing in the
private sector." CRef. 3:p.xi] In fact, over 50% of DoD's MFH units
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are in areas in which the cost of private sector housing is below the
national median average of $541 per month. Also, more than 53% of the
units are in areas where MFH accounts for less than 2% of the local
housing and only 20V. are in areas where it accounts for more than 5ft.
If the majority of MFH was located in high cost or isolated areas you
would expect fIFH to make up a much more significant percentage of that
area's housing. CRef. 3:p.l4]
4. Age of Units
Further complicating the housing issue is the fact that the
Navy's existing inventory of units is rapidly reaching the end of its
useful service life. Most of these units were built in the 1950's and
1960 's under the Wherry and Capehart construction programs. According
to the Department of Defense:
The inventory of government-owned housing units is aging. On
average one-third of the units are over 30 years old, one-third
over 20 years old, and the remaining third under 20. This aging
infrastructure is driving ever-increasing operations and
maintenance expenses and the need to fund high levels of
renovation and improvements to maintain the units in adequate
condition. CRef. 4:p.3]
"Replacing or revitalizing a housing unit can be expensive. The
median cost of a new DoD unit in the United States is about $100,000.
The typical cost of whole-house revital ization — an investment that
extends the service life of an existing unit by approximately 20 to 25
years — is $60,000." CRef. 3: p. 24] CB0 estimates that it will cost
approximately $880 million per year to replace or revitalize MFH.
However, because DoD is not meeting this $880 million per year figure,
CB0 estimates that the backlog of required construction equals roughly
$11 billion. If the DoD does not phase in construction for MFH they
will have to extend the service life of very old buildings, undertake a
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massive building program after the turn of the century, or phase out MFH
and force servicemembers to rely more on the private sector for housing.
5. Allowances and Incentives
Critics of the Variable Housing Allowance, such as the Rand
Corporation, point out that it is based not on the price of local
housing but on the expenditures of military personnel in that area
CRef. 14:p.l41. As a result, those living in a high cost area are not
compensated as much as those in low cost areas. This results because
personnel living in high cost areas reduce their housing consumption
because of the higher prices. This reduces the overall expenditures for
the area which in turn reduces the area's VHA. It has been recommended
that DoD shift the setting of VHA rates from local expenditures to
prices. DoD recognizes these problems and concluded in a recent review
that "the housing allowance has come to present the Department of
Defense with one of its greatest, most persistent compensation
challenges." CRef. 15:p.7]
6. Waiting Lists
Another persistent MFH problem is long waiting lists for
government quarters. In September 1992, 92,351 enlisted personnel and
15,648 officers were on waiting lists for DoD family housing CRef.
9:p.601. Some of these waiting lists are often over 9 to 30 months long
CRef. 4:p.7]. When a servicemember arrives at a duty station and no
housing is available he or she is placed on a waiting list until
government quarters becomes available. While waiting, a person receives
a Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAG)) and a Variable Housing Allowance
(VHA) to obtain housing in the private sector. A person may move into
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military housing from the private sector up to six months before being
transferred
.
"Because housing allowances are, in effect, the price military
families pay for DoD housing, low allowance levels spur a demand for
more DoD housing, which results in long waiting lists in some areas."
CRef. 3:p.l] The existence of a waiting list for DoD housing indicates
that those waiting value MFH more than the housing they could obtain in
the private sector for the same housing allowance. However, it is
virtually impossible for DoD to determine how much more they value MFH.
The only way to truly determine what the fair market value is for each
DoD unit is to determine how much rent a family would be willing to pay.
7. Constant Change of Occupants
Another problem with the current system is the high cost
associated with the constant change of occupants. Throughout DoD,
nearly 40% of the units change occupants annually. Each change incurs
maintenance costs between $250 to $1000 to get each unit ready for the
next occupant. In addition, when a member moves "from out in town" to
on-base, the military incurs an additional moving cost averaging $500.
The DoD said in DMRD 966; "Given the goal of providing adequate housing
for all military personnel, combined with the fact that over 72% of all
military families always live off base, it appears to be an unnecessary
expense and turbulence to move members, housed in adequate quarters in
the private sector, into government housing." CRef. 4:p.7]
The military currently spends about $3 billion annually on all
types of moves CRef. 9: p. 423. By reducing the number of moves, the
military saves not only money but also the stress on military life
associated with moving, changing schools, time away from work, etc.
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Off-base to on-base moves alone occur about 50,000 times annually at a
cost of $46 million CRef. 4:p.7].
F. DOD'S PLANS FOP. MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING
The DoD places a high priority on continuing its current MFH
program. For at least the next decade, the DoD plans on maintaining its
existing units. Base closures will result in a 4% inventory reduction
bringing the total down to 298,000 units. However, because the military
is in the process of reducing troop levels, the percentage of families
that will be provided military family housing is expected to increase
from 337. to 38*/. by 1999.
The cost of the current DoD plan is very expensive. The CB0
estimates that between 1994 and 1999 the DoD will have to spend an
average of $880 million annually to revitalize or replace its current
inventory. Unfortunately, the DoD is not keeping up with this target.
According to the CB0, Congress appropriated only $480 million in 1993
for new construction (continental U.S. only) and the Clinton
Administration requested only $500 million for 1994. CRef. 3:p.xiii]
G. PAST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has investigated the housing issue
many times through the Defense Management Report (DMR) process. The
DMR was designed to investigate ways in which DoD agencies could
streamline their organizations and operations to save both money and
manpower. When a review of an initiative is completed a Defense
Management Report Decision (DMRD) is prepared and sent to the heads of
the service agencies for comment. After service agency comments are
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received, the DMRD is forwarded to the SECDEF for a ruling on whether
the initiative will be accepted or rejected.
1. DMRD 910: Privatization of Military Family Housing
In October 1989, DoD considered DMRD 910 which proposed transfer
of MFH to the private sector. It's goal was to provide better
distribution of housing allowances by families and provide more
efficient and cost effective maintenance of units. It offered three
alternatives:
1. Give all families cash allowances for housing and charge market
rents to yield savings of $506 million in FY 1991.
2. Contract out the operations and maintenance and save $60 million
in reducing civilian end strength by 2,546 in FY 1991.
3. Sell or lease DoD housing resulting in revenues of $3,200 million
and reduce civilian end strength by 2,037 in FY 1991.
Under the first alternative, DoD retained ownership of the
housing units and charged rent based on market rates. DoD estimated
that at market rates the housing would rent for at least 2174 more than
current housing allowances. With VHA and BAG] rates unchanged, residents
would pay the extra 21'/*. Uncertainty existed over whether members would
be willing to pay a higher rent for government housing then for similar
housing in the private sector. However, DMRD 910 contended that
military members believed that the security of MFH was worth the
additional cost.
The Secretary of the Navy did not agree with DMRD 910. He
believed that the alternatives reversed 200 years of traditional
benefits by breaking faith with the military member, and would produce
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"a severe and immediate decline in the quality of life and morale of
personnel residing with their families in government housing."
CRef. 4:p.l3 DMRD 910 was not approved.
2. DMRD 966: Operating MFH as a Business Enterprise
The next DMRD that addressed military family housing was DMRD
966 in 1990. DMRD 966 proposed the operation of MFH as a business
enterprise. It maintained that the forfeited BAG) and VHA from members
residing in base housing should be used as the baseline for funding.
Servicemembers occupying government quarters would be charged monthly
rent equal to the amount they currently forfeit. The rental income
would be used to establish a local revolving account for the operations,
maintenance, renovations, management and replacement of the housing
assets. All work performed within the MFH community would be funded by
this account. Once the fund was established, all MFH projects would be
prioritized and funded in terms of the benefit to its MFH occupants.
This plan was sold as a viable option because:
The private sector charges in excess of their costs to make a
profit; there are overhead business expenses in the private sector
that the government does not have such as advertising; the private
sector has to pay local and federal taxes; the private sector
incurs costs for insurance; and the private sector must purchase
the land for their projects. CRef. 4:p.l3]
Ways in which the DMRD 966 proposal would allow housing units to
be operated in a business-like manner are:
1. Housing managers would obtain control of their staffing,
purchasing and increased contracting authority. Managers could make all
of their own decisions such as lay-offs, new construction, etc.
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2. Each servicemember would be free to use his or her entire housing
allowance on either government housing or private sector housing.
3. With the exception of military construction funds, which would be
treated as capital investment items, all funding for family housing
operations, maintenance, and improvements would be strictly Dased on
allowances collected from servicemembers.
DMRD 966 was not approved. It was the opinion of the Under
Secretary of the Navy that:
The proposal to run family housing, like a business, with a
dependence on housing allowances as its source of income ignores
reality. Allowances do not reflect the cost of building,
operating, and fining family housing. In fact, BAQ ana VHA
funding levels are inadequate to support the operation,
maintenance, repair, improvement, and capitalization of investment
expenses that we already must p3y. Also, the base commander does
not have the ability to set prices for housing as does the private
landlord. In summary, we will force fit the way we take care of
family housing in order to live within the arbitrary income
levels. CRef. 163
3. DMRD 971:The Defense Business Operations Fund
Although DMRD 966 was not approved, some of its goals were
realized in DMRD 971 which developed the Defense Business Operations
Fund (DBOF) concept. The following is a brief description of DMRD 971:
The primary goal of implementing the DBOF is to provide a
business management structure that encourages managers and
employees of Department of Defense support organizations to provide
their products or services at the lowest cost. The DBOF
essentially combines existing commercial or business operations
that were previously managed as individual revolving funds into a
single revolving or business management fund... DMRD 971 introduced
the theory of applying business-like practices to Department of
Defense financial management. The goals of DMRD 971, as outlined
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are based on creating a
business environment in DoD operations. As with all businesses, it
is essential that operations put a premium on quality and encourage
managers at all levels to reduce costs. [Ref. 17:p.G-53
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As a result of DMRD 971 and DBOF, "DoD comptrollers can investigate, if
not require, that MFH be operated on a self sustaining basis." CRef.
7: p. 20] The concept of using a revolving fund is a key element of this
thesis. As will be discussed in Chapter V, this thesis uses a revolving
fund to implement a rental system within a military family housing
program.
H. SUMMARY
This chapter has briefly described the current military family
housing program. Although the program has been successful in providing
housing to approximately one-third of the military's families, the
program is not without problems. The Department of Defense has
investigated these problems through its Defense Management Report
program, but to date has made few significant changes. This thesis
explores the implementation of a rental system in the military family
housing program as outlined by the DoD in DMRD 966 and the CBO in its
1993 study. Chapter IV gives a brief overview of the CBO study.
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IV. INSTITUTING A RENTAL MARKET IN MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING
A. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE PLAN
Although there have been many different recommendations ana reports
made to improve the current housing system, this thesis uses the
proposals contained in DMRD 966 and the Congressional Budget Office
report as the baseline for a DoD MFH rental system. The following is a
summary of the CBO recommendation:
(DoD should) set rents and operate its housing in a manner
similar to that of a private sector provider. Rents for each type
of unit at each installation would be set to eliminate both
persistent waiting lists and vacancies. DoD would continue to
operate its existing units as long as the rent they could command
covered at least the cost of their continued operation. However,
DoD would revitalize or replace an aging unit only if the rents it
anticipated covered the total cost of the unit to the federal
government (including amortized capital costs). Because of the
relatively high cost of DoD housing compared with housing in the
private sector, this policy would probably lead to a large, albeit
gradual, reduction in the stock of DoD family housing.
Moreover, despite the larger allowances the federal government
would pay, the option would save money because DoD would operate
its existing housing stock more efficiently and gradually reduce
its housing inventory in the locations in which the value of DoD
housing to servicemembers was less than the cost of providing the
housing. The amount of savings would depend on the extent of the
reduction in DoD inventories. If the rents DoD could charge
justified its retaining 25'/. of its units over the long run, the
annual savings between 1994 and 1999 would average approximately
$760 million.
In addition to producing savings ... using rental prices to
signal the value of DoD units to military personnel, the
department would have an automatic and credible process for
determining its family housing requirements. The criterion for
construction would be the value of the unit to servicemembers must
at least equal the government's cost of providing the unit.
CRef. 3:p.lS]
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B. CBQ ESTIMATE OF THE COST MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING
The CBO has determined that it is possible for the -federal
government to achieve savings in its military family housing program by
shifting to a rental policy. The CBO's estimates are based, however,
upon its assumptions about the cost of DoD housing. Before discussing
the CBO's savings estimates, its cost assumptions should be explained
further.
The Congressional Budget Office believes that the cost of MFH is
about 35'/. more than the private sector when the cost of land is
excluded. Table 7 CRef. 3:p.l8] gives a detailed description of the
CBO's assumptions.
TABLE 7:AVERAGE ANNUAL DOD COSTS COMPARED WITH PRIVATE SECTOR
(In 1993 dollars)
DoD Unit Private sector Unit
Operations h. Maintenance $6 , 200 Housing Allowances $7,500





Total $? , 200d
Total excluding land $12,500
Total including land $13,000
SOURCE: CBO based on data from the DoD and the Department of Education.
NOTE: The figure compares the average costs of a DOD unit in the U.S.
with what families now living in those units would choose to spend to
obtain housing in the private sector. It assumes that such families
would spend, on average, the same amount to obtain private sector
housing as similar military families (that is, families in the same
paygrade and location) who do live in private sector housing. It is not
necessarily a comparison between units of equal value in the eyes of
military families.
a. Construction costs were amortized over the service life of the unit
using an interest rate of 3 percent. This estimate assumes that initial
construction costs are $100,000, that units are revitalized at a cost of
$60,000 after 35 years, and that units are retired 22 years after being
revitalized.
b. The average Impact Aid paid by the Department of Education on behalf
of the children of families living in DoD units less the average costs
of the payment that would be made if those families lived in housing in
the private sector.
3?
c. The cost of holding land. It assumes that land for a DoD unit is
worth $15,000, on average, and that the annual cost to the federal
government of holding as asset is equal to 3'/. of its value.
d. This total implicitly includes all of the costs applicable to
housing in the private sector, including real estate taxes, the cost of
maintenance and utilities, the cost of holding land, depreciation, and
interest
.
The cost of land in the CBO estimates would only be included in the
total cost if it is believed that DoD would sell the lane once the land
was no longer going to be used for housinci.
C. POTENTIAL TAXPAYER SAVINGS
Based upon the Congressional Budget Office s DoD MFH housing cost
estimate, the CBO believes that savings can be obtained by implementing
a rental system. The CBO's estimate is pessimistic in nature because it
believes, in general, most housing complexes will not be able to compete
with the private sector. It should be pointed out, however, that this
is still consistent with the overall DoD strategy for military family
housing. The Department's overall strategy is to rely on the private
sector for housing the majority of its military families. The
Congressional Budget Office recommendation to implement a rental system
would likely reduce the DoD's involvement in the housing business, at
least in terms of the number of units operated by DoD.
A shift to a rental system would achieve savings because the DoD's
inventory would be slowly reduced. Those housing complexes where the
value of on-base quarters to military families is less than the cost to
the government will be forced to close. The amount of savings will
depend upon how quickly these marginal housing complexes close. The CBO
assumes that current units will continue to operate until they require a
whole-house revitalization or replacement. It also assumes that the
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rents that will be charged will justify replacing or repairing only 25%
of the units as they reach the required age. According to the
Congressional Budget Office:
This last assumption probably overstates the percentage of units
that DoD would maintain in the long run and thus understates the
savings from this option. The long-run average annual cost of a
DoD unit to the federal government is $12,500 — about 35 percent
more than servicemembers choose to pay for housing in the private
sector. Even if DoD housing were considered quite desirable, few
military families would be likely to feel that they could afford
to pay a 35 percent premium to obtain it. CRef. 3:p.49]
To understand why military families would be unlikely to spend the
additional 357. it is first necessary to explain why the Congressional
Budget Office believes most families seek MFH at all.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the implicit price
paid by military families living in government housing provides an
artificial incentive not to live in the private sector and is therefore
in contradiction to the DoD's current housing strategy.
The current DoD housing system provides what amounts to a price
subsidy that hides the full cost of DoD housing from military
families and encourages them to choose DoD housing over housing in
the private sector. Over the long run, the rent paid by military
families who live in private sector housing must cover all of the
costs incurred by the landlord who provides that housing. For
military families living in DoD housing, the situation is quite
different. The housing allowances that those families forfeit
are, in effect, the rent that they pay for DoD housing. But the
$7,500 in housing allowances that the average family living in DoD
housing forfeits accounts for only 60 percent of the $12,500 that
the federal government spends to provide a DoD housing unit (Table
8). DoD housing is actually about 35 to 40 percent more costly
than the private sector housing military families obtain, but it
appears to be approximately 20 percent less costly in their eyes -
- the 20 percent being the out-of-pocket costs they avoid.
CRef. 3:p.27]
Although the housing strategy of the Department of Defense is to
house most of its military families in the private sector, its housing
allowance policies actually encourage personnel to seek government
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quarters. Therefore, the Congressional Budget Office seeks to return
the Department of Defense to a strategy of relying on the private
sector. By slowly reducing the Department of Defense's interest in the
housing business, the CBO believes that not only will the housing
complexes that remain be operated in a more efficient manner, but also,
the DoD will realize substantial savings. Table 8 shows the CBO
estimates for savings under the rental system.
TABLE 8:DoD AVERAGE ANNUAL SAVINGS UNDER A RENTAL SYSTEM
(In millions of 1993 do 11 ars)
CATEGORY 1994--1999 2000--2014
Military Construction 640 620
Family Housing Operations 2< Maintenance 300 780
Housing Allowances Less Receipts (a) -230 -960
School Impact Aid 50 200
TOTAL 760 640
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Departments
of Defense and Education.
NOTES: These figures represent undiscounted savings by the federal
government relative to a fully funded DoD plan.
(a) The additional cost of allowances is less receipts from rents and
utility charges. These estimates take into account the cost of raising
allowance levels to hold constant the total out-of-pocket cost borne by
military families for housing.
(The CBO estimate of savings under the rental system) takes into
account the cost of providing housing allowances to all military
families and the cost of raising the level of allowance payments so
that the total out-of-pocket cost incurred by servicemembers is the
same as it would be under the (current) DoD plan. Thus, the
estimate of savings does not reflect dollars from the pockets of
military personnel. In addition, the savings estimate is not
affected by the amount of the rental payments DoD would receive
because all rents in excess of the cost of paying allowances to
those living in DoD housing would be returned to the entire force
in the form of higher allowances levels. CRef. 3:p.49]
According to the CBO:
If DoD's housing inventory decreased gradually—and permanently
—
to 25 percent of the level currently planned, the total of all
savings from the rental option would be approximately $16 billion.
(This estimate is discounted to take account of the value of money
over time.) Approximately $1 billion of the discounted savings
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would come from savings in utilities. Reducing the DoD inventory
would account tor the other $15 billion. CRef. 3:p.491
Utilities savings under the rental system would materialize because
both tenants and housing managers would have incentives to reduce costs.
As previously discussed, the military spends much more on utilities than
the private sector. Housing managers could reduce utilities consumption
by about 20% as scon as they installed meters. "This is expected to
save about $300 per DoD unit each year ($90 million annually at DoD's
current level of inventory)." CRef. 3:p.48]
D. DISADVANTAGES OF A SHIFT TO A RENTAL SYSTEM
One of the largest disadvantages of a DoD rental system is the large
start-up cost that will be required. A system for collecting rents will
have to be developed. Also, housing managers will incur the one-time
cost associated with installing meters. Another disadvantage is the
risk involved in setting initial rents. As previously discussed, the
DoD currently has no way of determining the true value of its current
housing inventory to its military tenants.
Initially, however, expert judgement would be needed to estimate
those levels, taking into account the length of current waiting
lists and the cost of comparable housing in the private sector.
Some errors would be inevitable, and adjustments in rents would
then be necessary if persistent waiting lists or vacancies
developed. Fortunately, DoD housing is usually constructed and
revitalized in blocks of between 100 and 300 similar units; DoD
thus could set initial rents without evaluating each housing unit
individually. CRef. 3: p. 50]
A rental system might also make it difficult to charge a suitable
rent for historic quarters assigned to senior officers. The cost to
maintain these old quarters is usually greater than the rents that could
be collected from tenants. To prevent an exorbitant rate being charged
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to those occupying historic quarters it would probably be necessary to
supplement a housing complex for these units.
In general, however, the Congressional Budget Office believes that
the advantages of rental system outweigh the disadvantages.
These disadvantages are important, but they must be weighed
against the key benefit of a rental system. More than the other
approaches in (the CBO) study, such a system would provide DoD
with clear signals about the housing preferences to shape its
decisions about family housing. On the one hand, those signals
would permit DoD to provide family housing in locations in which
the value of the units to servicemembers exceeded the costs to
DoD. On the other hand, they would discourage DoD from providing
housing in locations in which the cost of DoD housing exceeded the
value of the units to military personnel. [Ref. 3:p.52]
Perhaps most importantly, however, a change to a rental system will
bring the Department of Defense more in line with its own policy of
relying primarily on the private sector to house its servicemembers.
V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Accepting that there are inefficiencies in the current DoD military
family housing program, this thesis examines the specific solution
outlined by the Congressional Budget Office and DMRD 966. This chapter
attempts to determine the effects of a DoD rental system on a typical
housing program. Specifically, would a typical housing program, such as
the Naval Postgraduate School housing cample:-:, La Mesa Village, be able
to maintain its ability to operate, rebuild it's inventory, and be
likely to compete in the local housing market?
After providing a brief background of the Naval Postgraduate School
and its housing program, this chapter will accomplish the five
objectives as laid out in the methodology in Chapter I.
B. THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL HOUSING PROGRAM
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is located in Monterey,
California. It's primary function is to provide postgraduate education
to over 1,750 students from the Navy and other services as well as
personnel from the Department of Defense and several foreign countries.
1. History of NPS Housing
In 1945, the Naval Postgraduate School moved from the Naval
Academy in Annapolis, Maryland to the old Del Monte Hotel in Monterey,
California. The hotel and the surrounding 627 acres were purchased from
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the Del Monte Properties Company for $2.13 million. The current campus
consists of 615 acres at five different sites. CRef. 18:p.3]
While stationed at NPS, personnel may choose to live either in
family housing at La Mesa Village or seek private housing in Monterey.
Currently over one-half of all of the officers assigned to NPS utilize
La Mesa family housing. La Mesa Village is located one-half mile from
the NPS campus on Navy owned land. Officer housing at La Mesa village
consists of S77 family units. There are an additional 14 officer homes
on the NPS campus that house one civilian and 13 senior officer
families. This includes the admiral's quarters which were built in
1926. La Mesa Village offers a convenience store, beauty salon, si;:
tennis courts, little league fields, an elementary school and numerous
playgrounds. CRef. 18:p.6]
2. Types of Housing at NPS
The housing offers 34 different floor plans from two bedroom
quadraple::es to single homes with fireplaces. Development of the
housing complex began in 1952 with the construction of the first Wherry
Housing units. Wherry Housing is the oldest and largest of the current
housing. A total of 449 units were built ranging in size from 811 to
1,622 square feet. It offers both Field Grade (04-05) and Junior Grade
(01-03) quarters of both one and two stories. The units have between
two and four bedrooms. None of the units have garages, but 117 have
carports.
The next construction in La Mesa Village was Capehart Housing
built in 1962. A total of 150 Field Grade Quarters were built ranging
from 932 to 1,393 square feet. Each unit has between two to four
bedrooms and one to two baths. All Capeharts have attached carports.
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In 1965, 160 Funded Townhouses were built for Junior Grade
Quarters. The touinhouses have three to eight units per building with
most being two-story. All units within the townhouses have three
bedrooms, but none have fireplaces or carports. The units range from
1,171 to 1,228 square feet.
The final units to be built in La Mesa were the Funded
Townhouses in 1969. The housing consisted of two bedroom Junior Grade
units and three and four bedroom Field Grade units. Each building has
between four to eight units and all are two story complexes. The units
range from 1,031 square feet with two bedrooms and 1 and 1/2 baths to
1,406 square feet with four bedrooms and 2 1/2 baths. None of the
townhouses have carports or fireplaces. [Ref. 18:p.43 From Table 9 it
can be seen that all of the units at NPS are over 25 years old and that
over 50'/. are over 40 years old.
TABLE *NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL HOUSING INVENTORY
TYPE YEAR # OF UNITS PERCENTAGE
Admiral's Quarters 1926 1 < 1
NPS Senior Officer 1928 13 1
Wherry Apartments 1952 449 50
Capehart Apartments 1962 150 17
Townhouses 1965 160 18
Townhouses 1969 118 13
TOTAL 891 1 00
Enlisted personnel assigned duty at the Naval Postgraduate
School are currently offered family quarters at Fort Ord. When the
housing units in La Mesa were originally constructed, twenty units were
built to house enlisted personnel. Today, these "enlisted" quarters are
assigned to officer students.
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3. Housing Assignment
Officer housing is assigned based upon a person's rank and
number of dependents. Higher ranking individuals and those with a
larger number of children receive units with more square footage as well
as more bedrooms. Upon arrival at NPS each officer is offered two
different units to choose from based upon the following criteria:
TABLE 10:SIZE OF HOUSING IS SUED




2 children (with one over 10 years old) O
3 Children 3
3 children (with two over 10 years old) 4
3 children (one over 10, one of other two of 4
opposite sen and one over 6)
4 or more children 4
The number of bedrooms a servicemember is entitled to is based on the
following rationale:
1. No child should have to share a bedroom with the parent (s).
2. No more than two children should have to share any bedroom.
3. A child 6 years of age or over should not have to share a bedroom
with a child of the opposite sex.
4. A dependent 10 years of age or over is entitled to a separate
bedroom.
Each paygrade also has a minimum and maximum square footage
requirement. Tables 11 and 12 CRef. 6:p.331 show the unit sizes for
each paygrade.
TABLE ILCURRENT MINIMUM NET FLOORAREA
NUMBER OF BEDROOMS ENLISTED 01--03 04 AND UP
ONE BEDROOM 550 700
TWO BEDROOMS 750 865 950
THREE BEDROOMS 960 1 , 035 1,120
FOUR OR MORE 1,190 1,185 1,225
TABLE 12CURRENTMAXIMIMNETFL00RAREA
E1-E6 E7-03 04-05 06 07 AND UP
TWO BEDROOMS 950 950
THREE BEDROOMS 1 , 200 1,350 1 , 400
FOUR BEDROOMS 1,350 1,450 1,550 1,700 2, 100
FIVE BEDROOMS 1,550 1 ,550
The program at the Naval Postgraduate School was originally
designed to provide five different types of quarters. Flag officer (07)
and senior officer (06) quarters are located on the NPS campus. Field
grade (04-05), junior officer (01-03), and enlisted quarters are at La
Mesa. As originally built, each of these categories vary in quality and
size so as to reflect the increasing privileges associated with
increasing rank.
The units at La Mesa were primarily built to house Lieutenant
(03) and Lieutenant Commander (04) students. Therefore, as the
following table shows, most of the units are in this range. The 20
quarters originally built to house enlisted personnel are usually filled
by Lieutenants (03) and are therefore considered part of the (01-03)
category throughout the rest of this study. Table 13 CRef. 19] shows
the number of units by category and number of bedrooms.
TABLE 13:H0USING UTILIZATION AND OCCUPANCY REPORT
HOUSING CATEGORIES
NUMBER OF BEDROOMS 07 06 04--05 01-03 ENL. TOTAL
1 BEDROOM - - - - - Q
2 BEDROOMS - - 52 IS ™> 72
3 BEDROOMS - 7 200 466 14 687
4 BEDROOMS - 6 78 43 4 131
5 BEDROOMS 1 - - - - 1
TOTAL 1 13 330 527 20 391
4. Occupancy Rates
According to the housing staff, occupancy rates were
consistently above 90'/» during the past five years. Rates were lower in
1994 because of students being offered quarters at Fort Ord. Therefore,
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the 1993 occupancy percentages were used as representative figures
throughout this study. The following table shows the occupancy of La
Mesa's units from 1993 by category and rank. It should be noted,
however, that La Mesa has routinely had a waiting list for its housing.
Simultaneously having a waiting list and having vacant units is not
inconsistent because units often remain vacant for required maintenance
during a change of occupancy.
TABLE ^.CURRENT OCCUPANCY BY CATEGORY AND RANK
HOUSING CATEGORIES
RANK 07 06 04-05 01-03 TOTAL
07 ABOVE 1 1 civ il
06 10 11
04-05 1 189 15 205
01-03 o 117 479 596
TOTAL 1 12 307 494 814
OCCUPANCY 100% 92% 937. 90% 91%
5. Services Offered to Tenants
Every tenant at La Mesa Village receives many services free of
charge. Most are contracted out by the housing management to private
firms in the Monterey area. For example, local firms are paid for trash
collection, gas, electricity, water and entomological services (pest
control). La Mesa management is also able to utilize government
employees for performing various types of construction and maintenance.
Work performed by government employees is reimbursed by paying the
command supplying the labor. For example, the Naval Postgraduate School
provides fire and police protection to La Mesa Village and, in return,
the housing management pays a portion of their salaries. Some of the
reimbursable labor is performed by military personnel stationed at NPS
(station forces). For example, the local Civil Engineering Corps is
involved in several building projects each year. The Naval Facilities
Engineering Command is involved in all major construction.
La Mesa is responsible for all repairs to individual units and
makes periodic improvements. In 1994, for example, bath fans were
installed in 150 Capehart units and vanity cabinets were installed in
278 Townhouses. Typical repairs in 1994 were to main water valves, dry
rot and roofing problems. The housing management is also responsible
for repair and replacement of all installed kitchen appliances such as
refrigerators and dishwashers. A self-help center is provided free of
charge to occupants so that they may do their own repairs, gardening and
maintenance.
6. Housing Office Management
The La Mesa Village housing office has a staff of eight full-
time government employees. They are responsible for the day to day
operations of the housing complex such as budgeting, scheduling
maintenance, and assigning and inspecting quarters. The staff is headed
up by a GS12 housing manager and 6S09 assistant manager. A GS09 budget
analyst is responsible to the housing manager. Also working in the
housing office is one GS11 housing management specialists, three housing
management assistants (2 GS07/1 GS05 ) , a GS05 housing assignment clerk
and a GS05 data processing clerk.
7. Construction Plans
One major construction event is officially scheduled before the
end of the century. Beginning in 1994, the Navy will revitalize 165
Wherry units over two years. The first 102 Wherry family units have
been contracted at a cost of $3,846,449. Appendix A CRef. 203 lists the
specific repairs to be conducted. The revi tal ization project is
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expected to add an additional 25 years of service to each unit
renovated. Unofficially, the La Mesa management expects to revitalize
the 13 senior officer quarters beginning in the year 2000.
C. FIRST OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE LA MESA'S COSTS
1. FY 1994 La Mesa Budget
In order to determine if Naval Postgraduate School housing could
be operated and maintained at its current level, it is first necessary
to determine the current costs of operation. The following table lists
the direct and indirect costs associated with running the housing at
NPS. Costs are listed by Budget Project (BP) number and title. A
complete listing of La Mesa's fiscal year 1994 budget is contained in
Appendix B.
TABLE 15: FISCAL YEAR 1334 BUD GET
BP & TITLE TOTAL
10 SERVICES 575,900
1 1 MANAGEMENT 397 , 400
12 UTILITIES 1 , 745 , 200
14 FURNISHINGS 476 , 300
20 MAINTENANCE 1,764,098
TOTAL $4,959,398
Most of the costs listed in Appendix B are self-explanatory. It
should be noted, however, that the costs in the appendix are La Mesa's
original 1994 request for funds. The budget figures in Table 15 have
been increased slightly over those listed in Appendix B, largely because
of the addition of a new program called Neighborhood Excellence.
Although the NPS officially has 891 units, the admiral's quarters are
separately funded and therefore excluded from much of the analysis in
this thesis.
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2. La Mesa's Operating Costs Under a Rental System
For the purposes of this thesis, the only operating cost that is
assumed to vary, as a function of occupancy rate, is utilities. The
cost of services, management, furnishings and maintenance is assumed to
remain constant regardless of the number of units occupied. Although a
small amount of utility costs associated with operating such things as
the housing office will also remain fixed, tenant utility usage can be
expected to vary from family to family.
Assuming that the La Mesa housing management installs meters, it
can reduce consumption by making individuals responsible for their
usage. According to the Congressional Budget Office, "the cost of
utilities for rental units in the private sector drops 20% when people
become responsible for their own utility costs." [Ref. 3:p.22]
Therefore, discounting the utility consumption portion of La Mesa's
budget by 20'/. results in the reduced utility consumption figures in
Table 16, based upon La Mesa's budget listed in Appendix B.
TABLE 1G1A MESA'S EXPECTED UTILITY COSTS UNDER A RENTAL SYSTEM
TYPE OF UTILITY CONSUMPTION RATE TOTAL
B1A Electricity
La Mesa (877) 4,561,234 MWH $0.0960 per MWH $437,878
NPS (13) 292,547 MWH $0.0828 per MWH $24,223
BIB Gas 703,160 MBTU $0.8151 per MBTU $573,146
BID Water 71,570 KBAL $3.74 per KGAL $267,672
B1E Sewage 24,298 KGAL $2.65 per KGAL $64,390
TOTAL $1,376,319
Dividing the total utility cost ($1,376,319) by 814 units provides an
estimated average annual per unit cost of $1,691. Table 17 shows the
estimated annual fixed and variable costs required to operate La Mesa
Village.
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TABLE 17:LA MESA'S ESTIMATED OPERATING COSTS UNDERA RENTAL SYSTEM
BP & DESCRIPTION FIXED COSTS VARIABLE COSTS
10 SERVICES $575,900
1 1 MANAGEMENT $397 , 400
12 UTILITIES $19,841 $1,691 FER UNIT
14 FURNISHINGS $476,800
20 MAINTENANCE $1,764,098
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS $3,234,039 $1,691 PER UNIT
3. La Mesa's Estimated Revitalization Costs
This thesis assumes that the housing management is planning a
perpetual reconstruction program based upon its current inventory at 890
units. In order to afford the cost of construction and revital izat ion,
it is assumed that the revenues received through rents will be placed
into a revolving fund similar to the DoD Defense Business Operations
Fund (DBOF). According to the Congressional Budget Office the cost of
capital for DoD housing units can be estimated based upon the following
assumptions:
An average DoD unit is constructed at an initial cost of
$100,000; it is revitalized when it reaches 35 years of age at
an additional cost of $60,000; and it is retired, on average,
22.5 years later. (These assumptions are used throughout this
study and are consistent with estimates provided by DoD). Using
a real discount rate of 3 percent, the present discounted value
of these life-cycle capital costs is $120,000. The amortized
cost of capital for DoD units — approximately $4,400 — is that
present discounted value amortized, or spread out (using the 3
percent annual interest rate), over the entire 57.5 - year life
of the unit... CB0 analyses typically assume discount rates
ranging from zero percent to 4 percent, with 2 percent used as a
midpoint estimate. DoD, however, applies somewhat higher rates.
In accordance with the guidance in the Office of Management and
Budget's Circular A-94, those rates range from 2.7*/4 for projects
with short service lives to 3.8'/. for projects (such as the
construction of housing) that have service lives of 30 years or
more. CRef. 3:p.643
This thesis uses the Congressional Budget Office figures for
revitalization instead of using La Mesa's actual revitalization costs
for several reasons. One reason is that the revitalization of 165
Wherry units is a contract price. It is possible that the repairs to
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the units could exceed this price before the completion of the project.
Another reason is that the $4,400 cost of capital and the $60,000 per
unit revital izat ion cost are DoD wide estimates that take into account
the average repairs to all units and can be used to simulate the
construction and repairs of all units for the entire life of a housing
complex.
4. La Mesa's Estimated Total Costs Under a Rental System
Using the CB0 estimate of an annual cost of capital of $4,400
per unit and the actual costs of operation, Table 18 lists the total
costs required to run La Mesa. It is assumed that $4,400 per unit will
be charged regardless of whether a unit is occupied. The new figure
- cost of capital - added to this table is simply the per unit annual
cost of $4,400 times the number of units (890).
[ABLE 18:LA MESA'S ESTIfr[ATED TOTAL COSTS UNDER A RENTAL SYSTE]
BP & DESCRIPTION FIXED COSTS VARIABLE COSTS
10 SERVICES $575,900
11 MANAGEMENT $397 , 400
12 UTILITIES $19,841 $1,691 PER UNIT
14 FURNISHINGS $476 , 800
20 MAINTENANCE $1,764,098
COST OF CAPITAL $3,916,000
TOTAL COST $8,192,200 $1,691 PER UNIT
D. SECOND OBJECTIVE: ESTIMATE LA MESA'S REVENUES
This study assumes that if DoD implements a rental system within its
Military Family Housing program that rental rates will be set, at a
minimum, to ensure revenues exceed both its operating costs and the cost
to re-capitalize the housing program's assets. Like the private sector,
each housing complex will be required to operate from these revenues.
After setting an initial rent it should be possible to calculate La
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Mesa's net income in order to determine whether La Mesa could sustain
its MFH operation.
1 . Rent Concepts
As has been previously mentioned, the riskiest aspect of the
shift to a rental program would be setting the initial rental rates.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the DoD should "set rental
prices and operate its housing in a manner similar to the operations of
a private sector provider. Rents for each type of unit at each
installation would be set at levels that would eliminate waiting lists
and limit vacancies to only very brief periods." [Ref. 3:p.48]
The CBO is not specific on how to set this rent but does refer
to the "implicit" rent paid by military families. As mentioned in
Chapter IV, the housing allowances that military families forfeit by
moving into government quarters is the "rent that they pay for DoD
housing." Although the CBO does not say how to set this rent, it
acknowledges that adjustments would be required if waiting lists or
vacancies occurred.
The Rand Corporation has also studied the housing issue and
discussed how to place a value on military family housing.
The Rand Corporation observed:
Although DoD can fairly easily observe differences in
expenditures, it cannot observe differences in the price of
housing directly ... All methods of estimating price levels
essentially use observable expenditure data to infer price
levels... First, we should use expenditures for housing serv ices
,
not housing assets, as the starting point. That is, we must
convert observable data on expenditures. CRef. 15:p.l?]
The Rand Corporation's statements lend credibility to the idea of
valuing a unit based on its "imputed rent" which is the current housing
expenditure of military tenants. Lacking a better method to determine
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the true value of MFH units to military tenants, this thesis uses this
implicit value for its analysis.
This value will not be a perfect match because, as the
Congressional Budget Office points out, the implicit price paid by
military families living in government housing provides an artificial
incentive not to live in the private sector. "DoD housing is actually
about 35 to 40 percent more costly than the private sector housing
military families obtain, but it appears to be approximately 20 percent
less costly in their eyes — the 20 percent being the out-of-pocket
costs they avoid." CRef. 3:p.27]
In many cases, the actual market value of a DoD unit may be
higher or lower than a person's combined BAQ and VHA.
DoD housing managers sometimes argue that DoD must revitalize its
stock of housing to keep it comparable to the housing obtained by
military families in the private sector. Thus, the current
widespread backlog in revital ization could be an indication that
the quality of DoD units does not - in general - match the
physical quality of units in the private sector and that DoD units
would rent for less. On the other hand, military families who
value the way of life made possible by on-base housing might place
a higher value on DoD housing than they would on physically
comparable housing in the private sector. In that case, DoD
housing might rent for more than housing in the private sector.
CRef. 3:p.211
2. Rent Used in Thesis Analysis
For the purposes of this thesis, rental rates will be set to
match the value each tenant currently places on his or her unit. The
current DoD housing allowance is designed to reimburse an individual for
857. of his or her housing expenditures. The remaining 15*/. is expected
to be paid by the individual. By moving into government quarters,
servicemembers avoid the "out-of-pocket" costs that their counterparts
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in the private sector pay. Therefore, the price paid is actually only
85% of its actual value.
As was pointed out in Chapter III, because housing costs have
been rising faster than the adjustments to BAQ and VHA, experts now
believe that the BAQ and VHA only cover about 80% of an individual's
housing expenditures. Therefore, in ord°r to determine this "value" of
La Mesa's housing units it is possible to use the following eauation:
VHA + BAQ = 0.80 x (VALUE OF THE UNIT)
Written another way, this equation reads:
VALUE OF THE UNIT = 1.25 x (BAQ + VHA)
Setting an initial rent equal to this value makes it possible to
estimate La Mesa's annual revenue. However, to military tenants this
value includes utilities. The CBO points out that under a rental system
housing managers will install utility meters and charge their tenants in
order to control energy consumn~ : or noD tenants currently do not pay
for this usage, and it is a reasudau.L assumption that charging tenants
for something they currently receive for free would be viewed as an
erosion of the value of their housing.
Therefore, it would be prudent for a housing manager to discount
a person's rent by an amount equal to their utility consumption. This
thesis discounts a person's rent by 15% because La Mesa's current cost
of utilities ($1,745,200) is 15% of the total possible revenues
($12,077,892) that could be collected if rent was set equal to a unit's
value as shown in Table 19.
Table 19 estimates La Mesa's revenue, before discounting for
utilities, by using its current housing inventory at a 91% occupancy
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rate. The rates far BAD and VHA can be found in Appendixes C and D
All figures are rounded to the nearest whole dollar.
TABLE 13:REVENUE BEFORE DISCOUNTING FOR UTILITIES
UNIT # OF VALUE YEARLY
TYPE UNITS RANK BAQ VHA OF UNIT TOTAL
06 1 civ 899 ..J 1 ,603 19,236
to 06 810 449 1,573 188,760
1 05 780 478 1,573 18,876
04-05 1 06 810 449 1,573 13,876
189 04 688 449 1,421 7 222,328
117 03 569 366 1,168 1 639,872
01-03 15 04 688 449 1,421 255,780
479 03 569 366 1,168 6 ,713,664
TOTAL 813 12 ,077,392
Discounting the value of La Mesa's inventory by 15% yields the
following rental equation:
RENTAL RATE = 0.85 x VALUE OF THE UNIT
This equation makes it possible to set initial rental rates and estimate
La Mesa's annual revenue. Table 20 shows the revised rental rates and
yearly revenue derived from these assumptions:
TABLE 20:RENTAL REVENUE AFTER DISCOUNTING FOR UTILITIES
UNIT tt OF VALUE RENTAL YEARLY
TYPE UNITS RANK BAQ VHA OF UNIT RATE TOTAL
06 1 civ 899 uJQO 1 , 603 1 j W>OhJ 16,356
10 06 810 449 1,573 1 jj> 160,440
1 05 780 478 1 c "771
,
0/o 1 "T"T7X , jj / 16,044
04-05 1 06 810 449 1,573 1 T"T7 16,044
189 04 688 449 1,421 1 , 208 o ,739,744
117 03 569 366 1,168 993 1 ,394,172
1-03 15 04 688 449 1,421 1 , 208 217,440
479 03 569 366 1,168 993 5 ,707,764
TOTAL 813 $ 1 ,263,004
From Table 20 the expected average annual rental revenue from a
rental program when 91'/, of it's units are occupied would yield
$10,268,004. It should be pointed out, however, that for the purposes
of calculating net incomes in the next Objective, added to this revenue
will be the revenue collected from tenants for their utility usage.
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Under a rental system a housing manager will install meters and have the
ability to directly charge tenants.
Table 21 CRef. 21:p.l3 is provided to show that the rental rate
estimates in Table 20 are roughly equal to the value of housing in the
local private sector.
TABLE 2LAVERAGE RENTAL RATES IN THE MONTEREY AREA
ONE TWO THREE FOUR
LOCATION BEDROOM BEDROOMS BEDROOMS BEDROOMS
SEASIDE $507 $674 $928 $ 1 , 068
MARINA $558 $682 $938 $ 1 , 097
MONTEREY $599 $815 $1,209 $ 1 , 390
PACIFIC GROVE $621 $816 $1,192 $1,315
CARMEL $845 $1,253 $1,389 $2,010
SALINAS $485 $621 $851 $ 1 , 082
The Department of Defense defines a housing market as the area
within 30 miles and one hour commuting time. For the Naval Postgraduate
School this includes an area as far north as Santa Cruz and as far south
as Big Sur. According to the study, 75*/ of NPS students live on the
Monterey Peninsula proper, including the communities of Monterey,
Pacific Grove, Pebble Beach, and Carmel. Of those that live in this
area, 98'/. of them live no further away than Marina or Salinas.
[Ref. 21:p.ll
As Table 14 revealed, the majority of tenants living at La Mesa
are Lieutenants (03). By comparing an 03's rental rate at La Mesa with
Table 21 it can be seen that an 03 could rent a two bedroom unit
anywhere in the area except Carmel or rent a three bedroom unit in
Seaside, Marina and Salinas. Based on this information, it appears that
the rental rates chosen in this thesis are adequate estimates.
58
E. THIRD OBJECTIVE: ANALYZE LA MESA'S NET INCOME
1. Simulation of a Revi tal izat ion Schedule
As previously mentioned, most of La Mesa 's current inventory was
built under the Wherry and Capehart construction programs during the
1950 's and 1960 's. The CBO says that a unit has exceeded its useful
service life and needs revital ization when it reacnes an age of 35
years. Therefore, all of the Wherry units (42 years old-1 require
immediate revitalization. In order to determine revenues based on the
number of units available for renting over the next twenty years, as
well as to estimate the cost of La Mesa's revital ization efforts, a
revital ization schedule is necessary.
The current Navy Phase I plan includes only one-third of the 449
Wherry units. To complete the Wherry project, this thesis assumes that
it is sufficient to break the balance of the project into two additional
construction phases. All other housing projects after the Wherry
project will begin revitalization at the beginning of their 36th year of
service in order to stay consistent with the CBO recommendation.
Using Phase I as a model, each phase is broken up into three
building periods of eight months each. Like Phase I, only one-third of
the units in each phase will be unavailable for renting at any time
during the phase. Table 22 is a simulated revitalization schedule from
these assumptions. The totals at the bottom of the table represent the
number of units that will be available for rent each year.
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TABLE 22±A MESA'S SIMULATED REVITAT.rZATIQN SCHEDULE
YEAR 94 95 96 97 93 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
TYPE OF UNIT
Senior Off icar XXX XXX
Wherry
Phase I XXX XXX
Phase II XXX XXX
Phase III XXX XXX
Capehart
Phase IV XXX XXX
65 Townhouse
Phase V XXX XXX
69 Townhouse
Phase VI XXX XXX
3VA I LABLE 335 335 343 343 793 793 332 332 390 390 35 1 35 1 390 390 890 890 390 390 390 390
2. Determination of La Mesa's Net Income
In order to estimate La Mesa's income over a 20 year period the
following assumptions were made:
1. La Mesa's inventory does not change.
2. Demand and occupancy remain constant therefore, the number of
units rented each year is derived from the number of units available
(after revitalization) as shown in Table 22.
3. The distribution of officer ranks among the different types of
quarters remains constant.
4. La Mesa's housing management will install utility meters in all
units and begin charging individual tenants for their consumption
($1,691 per tenant for the purposes of this thesis).
5. All revenues and costs are in FY 1994 dollars.
Based upon these assumptions, this thesis simplifies La Mesa's
expected annual income by taking the estimated annual revenue from Table
20 ($10,268,004) and dividing this amount by the current number of units
occupied (913) in order to obtain an average income per unit ($12,630).
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Because the number of units available for rent varies from year to year,
by using this average income per unit it is possible to estimate La
Mesa ' = income over a 20 year period.
Using the estimated number of units available for rent, the
estimated annual rental revenue, the revenue from utility charges to
tenants and the estimated annual costs it is Qossible to analyze La
Mesa's ability to ooerate under the new system. The following graph
shows that according to these assumptions. La Mesa would yield positive
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F. FOURTH OBJECTIVE: ANALYZE LA MESA'S CASH FLOW
According to the CBO recommendation in order to afford the cost of
rebuilding and revitalizing its inventory, a military family housing
program would collect all revenues received through rents and place them
into a revolving fund similar to the DoD Defense Business Operations
Fund (DBOF). It should be noted, however, that this revolving fund
exists on paper only. A revolving fund is not kept with a financial
institution, but rather all revenues are returned to the Treasury. A
housing program is allowed to make expenditures out of the Treasury up
to, but not exceeding its revolving fund balance. Expenditures from a
fund in excess of its balance are legal violations.
For the purposes of this thesis, La Mesa's annual net contributions
to this revolving fund will be simplified by using the $4,400 annual
cost of capital per unit and any positive net income left over from its
operations. In reality, all revenues and all expenses pass through the
fund. From this revolving fund will be subtracted out the cost of
revitalization as scheduled in Table 22. The fallowing graph shows that
according to these assumptions, La Mesa's revolving fund sustains
positive net growth, therefore, from a cash flow perspective, a rental
system at the Naval Postgraduate School can be expected to succeed.
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REVOLVING FUND NET GROWTH
La Mesa Village. 1 994
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G. FIFTH OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE THE NET LOSS/NET GAIN TO THE TAXPAYEF
1. Introduction
The shift to a rental system is actually a change in the way the
government funds housing. As was discussed in Chapter III, the system
is currently funded through the Family Housing, Navy and Marine Corps
(FH,N?<MC) Appropriation. A rental plan would do away with this
appropriation and instead fund housing by giving all servicemembers
housing allowances, thus increasing the Military Personnel, Navy (MPN)
Appropriation. Although this thesis shows that La Mesa Village should
be able to operate under a rental system, the real question to be
answered for policymakers is whether the increase in the MPN account
will be larger than the reduction in the FH,N?<MC account. In essence,
is this system more cost-effective to the federal governmentand the
taxpayer
S3
2. Estimated Increase to the MPN Account
The first objective in answering this question is to determine
how much the MPN account would increase. In order to simplify the
calculations, an average allowance per tenant was calculated and then
used over the twenty year period. This should be a fair assumption
because over twenty years, although there is bound to be some variance,
the rank structure of tenants at La Mesa will probably remain fairly
constant. Table 23 shows the increase in the MPN account from La Mesa's
tenants.
TABLE 23INCE.EASE IN THE MPN ACCOUNT FOR LA ME SA TENANTS
Unit # of YEARLY
Type Units RANK BAQ VHA TOTAL TOTAL
06 10 06 810 449 1,259 151,080
1 05 780 478 1,258 15,096
04-05 1 06 810 449 1,259 15,108
189 04 688 449 1,137 ,578,716
117 03 569 366 935 1 ,312,740
01-03 15 04 688 449 1,137 204 , 660
479 03 569 366 935 5 ,374,300
TOTAL 812 $9 ,651 ,700
When the total $9,651,700 is divided by the current number of military
tenants the average yearly increase to the MPN account amounts to
$11,886 per tenant. The number of units available after revitalization
varies from year to year, therefore, this per tenant amount can be used
to estimate the BAQ and VHA allowances received by La Mesa "s military
tenants. The following graph shows that the expected MPN expenditures
in FY 1994 dollars over a 20 year period would cause an increase to the
MPN account of $176,760,000.
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3. Estimated Decrease to the FH,N8<MC Account
The FH,N&MC account is actually made up of two funds, Operations
& Maintenance and Construction. For La Mesa, this amount is the sum of
its operating and revitalization budgets over the next twenty years.
The Operations 2< Maintenance account is relatively easy to estimate for
the next 20 years. La Mesa received $4,959,000 last year and can be
expected to receive approximately the same amount in FY 1994 dollars
over the next 20 years.
The Construction part of this appropriation is much more
difficult to estimate. Under the current system the DoD does not set
aside any funds for future construction. In fact, DoD's revitalization,
which is underfunded by an estimated $11 billion, is completely
dependent upon future Congressional appropriations. According to the
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CBO, the Department of Defense should be spending approximately $880
million each year to revitalize its current inventory. As Table 4
shows, however, the DoD has not been meeting this figure.
In order to remain consistent with the CBQ study, this thesis
estimates future construction expenditures using the same assumptions
used in the previous objective. Using the simulated revital nation
schedule and a cost of $60,000 per unit, the total cost of revitalizing
La Mesa '5 inventory equals $42,720,000. Totaling the expected
Operations ?< Maintenance expenditures and the Construction expenditures
yields a total cost of $141,900,000.
4. Determination of Any Net Gain or Net Loss to the Taxpayer
Totaling both the MPN expenditures (-$176,760,000) and the
FH,N?/MC savings ($141,900,000) reveals that giving all personnel at the
Naval Postgraduate School housing allowances would result in a net loss
to the government of approximately $34,860,000. Although La Mesa would
be $34,860,000 more costly over 20 years to operate under a rental
system than under the current system, as was shown in Chapter IV, the
CBO believes that the increases in the MPN account will be more than
offset by the savings from other housing closures.
By slowly reducing the Department of Defense's inventory, the
CBO believes that not only will the remaining housing complexes be
operated in a more efficient manner, but also, will yield substantial
savings to the DoD. The CBO believes that only 257. of DoD's current
housing will remain after implementing a rental system. Therefore, if
the CBO projections are correct, the military family nousing program at
the Naval Postgraduate School would likely be one of those remaining.
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As was shown in Chapter II, the Department ot Defense has
historically relied upon the private sector for housing its armed
forces. Despite the large standing Army created by the Cold War and the
incentives required for an All-Volunteer force, the DoD still abides by
this policy. As was shown in Table 5, two-thirds of all military
families live in the private sector.
However, as was discussed in the Introduction, the current fiscal
environment is causing the Department of Defense to seek cost-saving
alternatives. The Congressional Budget Office and other organizations
have determined that the DoD's military family housing program is one
program that could yield savings. One recommendation, and the focus of
this thesis, was to institute a rental market within DoD's military
family housing program.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis explored this option by simulating a rental program at
one housing complex, La Mesa Village at the Naval Postgraduate School.
After investigating La Mesa's costs and setting initial rental rates
this thesis concludes that a rental program at La Mesa would provide
sufficient net income and cash flow to continue to operate. It was
shown that the program would cause a net loss to the government when
compared to the current program, when applied to the La Mesa housing
G7
complex. This net loss is not a relevant figure for evaluating the
effect of a DoD wide rental program since the CBO projects a substantial
reduction in housing inventory under the rental plan and concludes that
substantial savings would be realized on those complexes closed.
Although the major focus of this thesis was to investigate the ability
of one housing program to sustain its operations under a rental system,
several other findings were revealed during this study that may prove
beneficial to future researchers.
C. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICYMAKERS
The Department of Defense is the world's largest landlord with over
300,000 units in the United States. Unfortunately, the DoD faces a
significant challenge in the years ahead because, as was pointed out in
Chapter II, most of this inventory was built during the 1950 's and
1960 's. Assuming the CBO's recommendation is adopted by DoD, the CBO
indicates that only 25'/. of this large inventory are likely to be able to
compete with the private sector.
One observation made during this thesis was that because most DoD
complexes have inventories that require immediate revital ization, many
housing programs will be confronted with a cash flow situation similar
to La Mesa's. In order to fund immediate revitalization, large
revolving fund cash balances will be required very early. As a result,
recently constructed housing complexes or complexes that have recently
undergone revitalization will have a distinct advantage over those
complexes that have not.
Another observation was that La Mesa is not a typical housing
program. Its tenants are all officers and therefore the potential
revenues from rents, which are based in part upon current BAG) and VHA
allowances, is very high. Other housing programs, made up of a higher
percentage of enlisted personnel, may not be able to realize the high
revenue figures attainable at La Mesa and therefore may not be able to
cover the costs associated with immediate revitalization. It is also
possible that higher allowance levels, in states such as California, may
result in housing programs in high cost areas achieving higher revenue
figures than those programs in low cost areas.
Obviously, high net income figures give the housing management at La
Mesa distinct advantages. As was shown in Chapter V, higher net income
figures drive up the growth of La Mesa's revolving fund. This cushion
allows for any unexpected losses from operations or from the initial
rental rates being too high. Based upon La Mesa s expected net income
and immediate revital ization needs, it appears that annual average
revenues could go as low as $10,500 per unit and still break even.
Conversely, however, rapid growth in La Mesa's revolving fund may
not go unnoticed by Navy and DoD budgeteers. As was experienced during
the early stages of the DBOF, excess funds lying unused in a revolving
fund are prime targets when additional funds are needed elsewhere in the
Department of the Navy. To protect these funds, a possible strategy by
La Mesa's housing management might be to use the large corpus of funds
to begin early demolition and reconstruction of its aging units.
Another strategy might be to use the additional funds to make
quality of life improvements for its tenants. These improvements will
likely be viewed as necessary if a military housing program is to remain
competitive with private sector housing. A third option might be to
reduce its rental rates in order to reduce net income thus keeping its
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revolving fund more in line with its required cost of capital. This
would also serve to reward tenants for living in very old quarters and
might counteract the negative effects associated with changing the
current system.
D. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
The study of implementing a rental system within a current military
family housing program has generated a number of related issues that
were not addressed in this thesis. These issues may serve as possible
topics for further study.
Although this study makes utility consumption reductions as a result
of changing to a rental system, the thesis did not explore all of the
possible operating cost changes. One possible research topic might be
to determine actual implementation procedures for La Mesa s housing
management. Specific changes such as revised management policies, staff
changes, rent collection, meter installation, and maintenance schedules
could be addressed. After determining specific procedures for
implementing this system it would be possible to make a more detailed
breakdown of the changes in operating costs.
In order to get an accurate estimate for initial rental rates, a
detailed study on officer preferences for different types of housing
would be essential. As mentioned in this thesis, the DoD does not have
an effective method for determining the value of its current housing
inventory. The existence of waiting lists is an indication that
military families value military housing. However, exactly how much
more a family values DoD housinq over private sector housinq is unclear.
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A study into why military families value MFH and how to place a dollar
estimate on this would be extremely beneficial.
A detailed analysis of the supply and demand for military housing on
the Monterey Peninsula would also be essential before deciding to
actually implement a rental system in any housing program. If a housing
cample;-: is unable to compete with the private sector it would be prudent
to have an assessment of the local market's ability to adequately and
affordably house a command's military families.
The CBO study discusses the problems in the current VHA program.
The current VHA system determines allowance levels based upon housing
expenditures instead of housing prices which, as was discussed in
Chapter III, tends to reduce allowance levels in high cost areas. A
useful study might be to analyze the magnitude of this inequity and
recommend possible solutions for setting rates to prices.
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APPENDIX A:PHASE I REVITILIZATION FOR 102 WHERRY UNITS
(in FY 1994 dollars)
DESCRIPTION UNIT
COST TOTAL
repair exterior dry rot 702 17,901
repair interior dry rot- 15,575
repair damaged rood eaves 350 23 , 205
repair closet doors and track 867 88 , 470
retexture and repaint interior 2,472 252,121
repair exterior stucco cracking/damage 9 , 274 945 , 906
lead paint abatement 4,972 507.140
replace existing roofing and flashing 1 1 , 605 1,1 b-_- , / JlCl
renovate interior electrical system 1 , 092 111,369
replace doorbell chimes 197 20 ,082
replace existing incandescent light fi xtures 1,074 109,589
remove existing exposed telephone and CATC 995 101,533
bring existing service risers up to code 195 64,513
correct grounding code violations 1,865 lijii. , tj>88
remove excess exterior telephone/CATV cables 200 20 , 365
provide new entry rear doors 1
,
920 195,841
TOTAL REPAIR COST FOR 102 UNITS $39,355 $3,846,449
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APPENDIX B:LA MESA'S FY 1994 BUDGET
OPERATION
Al MANAGEMENT
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E REPAIRS
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0-10 730.50 50.70 899.10
0-9 730.50 50. 70 899. 10
0-8 730.50 50.70 899.10
0-7 730.50 50.70 899.10
0-6 670.20 39 . 60 809 . 70
0-5 645 . 30 33 . 00 780 . 30
0-4 598.20 26 . 70 687 . 90
0-3 479 . 40 22 . 20 569.40
0-2 380 . 1 17.70 486 . 30
0-1 320.10 13.20 434.40
0-3E 517.50 nn *7 r\ 611.70
0-2E 440 . 1 17.70 552.00
0-1E 378 . 30 13.20 5 1 . 00
W-5 607.50 25 . 20 663 . 90
W-4 539.70 25 . 20 608 . 70
W-3 453.60 20 . 70 558.00
W-2 402 . 60 15.90 513. 30
W-l 337 . 20 13.80 444 . 00
E-9 443.40 18.60 584.10
E-S 407.10 15.30 538.50
E-7 347 . 40 12.00 500. 10
E-6 314.70 9 . 90 462 . 30
E-5 290. 10 8 . 70 415.50
E-4 252.30 8.10 361.50
E-3 247.30 7 . 80 ^*i>6 . *-/0
E-2 20 1 . 30 7 . 20 320. 10
E-l 179.10 6 . 90 320.10
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